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Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals: California
Expands Liability for Negligently Inflicted
Emotional Distress
While mental tranquility is now recognized as an important inter-
est, it historically received little legal protection.' Liability for mental
injury expanded only slowly over the decades, 2 because courts, in their
reluctance to allow recovery for mental injury,3 conjured up numerous
excuses for not protecting peace of mind.4
The most perplexing problem that courts now face in this area is
determining the circumstances in which to allow recovery for negli-
gently inflicted emotional distress. It is well settled that recovery for
mental injury is possible when the defendant intentionally or recklessly
engages in extreme and outrageous conduct that causes severe mental
injury to the plaintiff5 Recovery is also possible when the defendant
commits a "host" tort6 that causes mental injury to the plaintiff.7 No
general agreement has been reached, however, about the circumstances
1. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 49-50 (4th ed. 1971) [here-
inafter cited as PROSSER]; Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts,
49 HARV. L. Rv. 1033, 1035 (1936).
2. 1 . DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 15.01 (1977) [hereinafter cited as DOOLEY];
PROSSER, supra note 1, § 54, at 327-35. For the development of California law, see 4 B.
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW TORTS §§ 548-53 (8th ed. 1974).
3. The terms "mental distress," "mental injury," "emotional distress," and "emotional
injury" are used interchangeably throughout this Note.
4. Early courts claimed that mental injury was too subtle and speculative, see, e.g.,
Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896); that mental injury was not
proximately caused by the allegedly negligent act, see, e.g., Chittick v. Philadelphia Rapid
Trans. Co., 224 Pa. 13, 73 A. 4 (1909); that mental injury, by its very nature, could be easily
feigned and therefore fictitious claims would flood the courts, see, e.g., Huston v. Borough of
Freemansburg, 212 Pa. 548, 61 A. 1022 (1905); and that allowing recovery for mental injury
would subject defendants to potentially unlimited liability, see, e.g., Ward v. West Jersey &
S.R.R., 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 A. 561 (1900).
5. See, e.g., State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Silizinoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282
(1952). See generally DOOLEY, supra note 2, § 15.03; PROSSER, supra note I, § 12, at 49-62;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, comment j, at 78 (1965).
6. A "host" tort is a tort such as battery, slander, or false imprisonment, which gives
rise to recovery for mental injury in the form of parasitic damages. Rodrigues v. State, 52
Hawaii 156, 170, 472 P.2d 509, 519 (1970); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 47,
comment b, at 80 (1965).
7. T. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS § 16 (student's ed. 1930); DOOLEY, supra note 2,
§ 15.02; PROSSER, supra note 1, § 12, at 52; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 47, com-
ment b, at 80 (1965).
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in which independent liability for negligently inflicted emotional dis-
tress should be recognized.
As courts began to recognize that the need to allow recovery for
negligently inflicted emotional distress outweighed perceived risks, 8
rules were formulated to allow recovery in certain circumstances. 9 The
complexity of the rules is baffling, however, and the factors given
weight under the rules often seem to have been chosen arbitrarily.' 0
A small minority of jurisdictions has abandoned these rules and
adopted a single rule applicable to all claims involving negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress." California appears to have joined this mi-
nority. In Mo/len v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,12 the California
Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could recover for serious emotional
distress, despite an absence of physical injury, ' 3 if the circumstances of
the case guarantee that the claim of emotional distress was genuine' 4
and the plaintiffs injury was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. ' 5
The Molien rule creates new problems. It is not entirely clear
whether Molien will be applied to all claims of negligent infliction of
emotional distress. In addition, if Molien is applied generally, it must
be determined under what facts recovery will be allowed. This Com-
ment examines both issues. The Comment first explores the historical
developments of the law of negligent infliction of emotional distress.
The Comment then discusses the Molien holding, its scope, and its ef-
fect upon California law. Finally, the Comment examines each of the
elements of the Molien rule-the guarantee of genuineness, serious
mental injury, and foreseeability of the injury-in an attempt to deter-
mine the circumstances in which recovery will be allowed under the
Molien rule.
8. Courts were concerned primarily with the possibility of exposing defendants to po-
tentially unlimited liability, and of flooding the courts with fictitious claims. Spade v. Lynn
& Boston R. R., 168 Mass. 285, 288, 47 N.E. 88, 89 (1897); Ward v. West Jersey & S.R.R., 65
N.J.L. 383, 47 A. 561 (1900); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896);
Huston v. Borough of Freemansburg, 212 Pa. 548, 61 A. 1022 (1905).
9. See notes 22-56 & accompanying text infra.
10. In Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 746, 441 P.2d 912, 924, 60 Cal. Rptr. 72, 84
(1968), the court observed: "In short, the history of the cases does not show the development
of a logical rule but rather a series of changes and abandonments." See also Rodrigues v.
State, 52 Hawaii 156, 171, 472 P.2d 509, 510 (1970).
11. Hawaii, Maine, and New York appear to have adopted such a rule. See notes 68,
90-96, 99-101 & accompanying text infra.
12. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
13. See text accompanying notes 22-23 infra.
14. 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
15. Id. at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
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History
The Distinction Between Physical Risk and Mental Risk Conduct
To avoid much of the confusion surrounding the law governing
liability for negligently inflicted emotional distress,'16 two types of con-
duct must be distinguished. First, the defendant's conduct may create a
risk of causing primarily physical harm to the plaintiff or a third per-
son, and the plaintiff may consequently sustain mental injuries in the
form of great fear, sadness, pain or anxiety. 17 This type of conduct,
which may be characterized as "physical risk conduct," is exemplified
by the situation in which a defendant operates an automobile care-
lessly, placing the plaintiff in great fear for his or her life,' 8 or for the
life of his or her child.' 9
A second type of conduct, which may be referred to as "mental
risk conduct," occurs when the defendant's conduct creates a risk of
causing primarily mental harm. In this situation, physical harm can
result only when it flows from the mental injury. If, for example, the
defendant negligently and erroneously informs the plaintiff that a close
relative has passed away,20 the plaintiff may sustain severe emotional
distress in the form of sadness, grief, or anxiety. Obviously, in this situ-
ation, physical injury can result not from an impact upon the plaintiffs
physical person, but only as a consequence of the emotional distress.
The distinction between physical risk conduct and mental risk
conduct is important because the rules used to determine liability fre-
quently apply only to physical risk conduct. Traditionally, recovery
has been allowed more frequently when the defendant's conduct cre-
ates a risk of causing primarily physical injury than when it creates a
risk of causing primarily mental injury.21
Recovery for Physical Risk Conduct
The Physical Injury Requirement
When courts finally recognized mental tranquility as a protectable
interest, they insisted upon strong proof that claims for mental injury
were genuine. 22 Physical injury, either resulting directly from the neg-
16. "The case law in the field... is in an almost unparalleled state of confusion."
Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 103 (1959). T. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS § 16 (student's ed. 1930).
17. Physical injuries may result either from a force set in motion by the defendant's
conduct, or as a consequence of the mental injuries.
18. See, e.g., Cook v. Maier, 33 Cal. App. 2d 581, 92 P.2d 434 (1957).
19. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 60 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
20. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590 (1975).
21. See notes 22-56 & accompanying text infra.
22. See Huston v. Borough of Freemansburg, 212 Pa. 548, 61 A. 1022 (1905). "In the
last half century, the ingenuity of counsel.., has expanded the action of negligence until it
overtops all others in frequency and importance; but it is only in the very end of that period
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ligent act or stemming from the emotional distress, was considered
strong proof of mental injury; indeed, physical injury was deemed an
essential element of a claim for mental injury in virtually all
jurisdictions.2 3
The Impact Rule
Under early tort law, physical injury was not sufficient to support a
claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. In addition to physi-
cal injury, many jurisdictions required that the defendant's conduct set
in motion a force that ultimately impacted upon the plaintiff's person.24
Recovery for mental injury in these jurisdictions was allowed, for ex-
ample, when the defendant negligently operated a vehicle that actually
collided with the plaintiff,25 but was denied when the defendant's vehi-
cle barely missed the plaintiff.26
The requirement of impact is apparently justified on the theory
that the plaintiff's claim is more likely to be legitimate when impact
occurs than when it does not.27 When the impact is substantial, this
theory is defensible. Courts, however, have not restricted recovery to
situations in which the impact is substantial, but have found impact
that it has been stretched to the effort to cover so intangible, so untrustworthy, so illusory,
and so speculative a cause of action as mere mental disturbance. It requires but a brief
judicial experience to be convinced of the large proportion of exaggeration, and even actual
fraud, in the ordinary action for physical injuries from negligence; and if we opened the
door to this new invention the result would be great danger, if not disaster, to the cause of
practical justice.").
23. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1031-33 (1956); PROSSER, supra note
1, § 54, at 328-29; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965). There was no require-
ment, however, of serious physical injury. See, e.g., Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga.
App. 581, 144 S.E. 680 (1928) holding that when circus horse owned by defendant evacuated
bowels in plaintiff's lap during circus performance, physical injury sufficient to support ac-
tion for mental injury resulted).
In California, the physical injury requirement was particularly entrenched in the case
law. See, e.g., Leasman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 48 Cal. App. 3d 376, 121 Cal. Rptr. 768
(1975); Hair v. County of Monterey, 45 Cal. App. 3d 538, 119 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1975); Vanoni
v. Western Airlines, 247 Cal. App. 2d 793, 56 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967). Cf. CALIFORNIA JURY
INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL (BAJI) No. 12.80 (6th ed. 1977) ("There can be no recovery of dam-
ages for emotional distress unaccompanied by physical injury where such emotional distress
arises only from negligent conduct.").
Molien eliminated the physical injury requirement in California. Hawaii, New York,
and Maine also have allowed recovery in the absence of physical injury. See notes 68, 90-96,
99-101 & accompanying text infra.
24. DOOLEY, supra note 2, § 15.05; PROSSER, supra note 1, § 54, at 330-33; Annot., 64
A.L.R.2d 100, 134-43 (1959). California refused to adopt the impact rule. See note 33 infra.
25. Lambertson v. Consolidated Traction Co., 59 N.J.L. 297, 36 A. 100 (1897).
26. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
27. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 54, at 331.
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when the plaintiff received a slight blow, 28 got dust in the eye,29 or in-
haled smoke. 30 In these circumstances, there is little more guarantee of
the genuineness of the emotional injury than if there had been no im-
pact. Many courts, recognizing this fact, rejected the impact rule.31
The Zone of Danger Rule
With the demise of the impact rule, the "zone of danger" rule
gained support in a majority of jurisdictions, 32 including California.33
Under this rule, liability for negligently inflicted emotional distress is
expanded to include situations in which the defendant's negligent con-
duct places the plaintiff in "fear of immediate personal injury," and the
plaintiff sustains both mental and physical injuries.34 The zone of dan-
ger rule recognizes that one may sustain serious emotional distress
caused by fear for one's own safety even in the absence of "impact,"
and therefore it is clearly an improvement over the impact rule.
The zone of danger rule, however, can also give rise to anomalous
results. Thus, although the mental distress resulting from injury to a
close relative might be as great as that resulting from fear for one's own
safety, under the zone of danger rule, recovery is allowed only for emo-
tional distress resulting from fear for one's own safety.35 Until 1968, no
American jurisdiction 6 was willing to extend a negligent defendant's
liability to include mental injury caused by witnessing an injury to a
third person;37 fear of fictitious claims and of exposing the defendant to
unlimited liability prevented such an extension.38
28. Homans v. Boston Elev. R.R., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902); Spade v. Lynn &
Boston R.R., 172 Mass. 488, 52 N.E. 747 (1898).
29. Porter v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 A. 860 (1906).
30. Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930).
31. See Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 58 Del. 454, 210 A.2d 709 (1965); First Nat'l Bank
v. Langley, 314 So. 2d 324 (Miss. S. Ct. 1975); Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12
(1965); Batalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961), overruling
Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107,45 N.E. 354 (1896); Savard v. Cody Chevrolet, Inc.,
126 Vt. 405, 234 A.2d 656 (1967).
32. See, e.g., Purcell v. St. Paul City R.R., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892); Salmi v.
Columbia & N. River R.R., 75 Or. 200, 146 P. 819 (1915). See generally Annot., 64
A.L.R.2d 100, 143-50 (1959); DOOLEY, supra note 2, at § 15.06.
33. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr.
33 (1963); Cook v. Maier, 33 Cal. App. 2d 581, 92 P.2d 434 (1939)..
34. Id.
35. See Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 33 (1963).
36. England first expanded liability beyond the zone of danger. Hambrook v. Stokes
Bros. [1925] 1 K.B. 141.
37. California was the first American jurisdiction to extend liability to the mental inju-
ries of a witness. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 60 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
38. See note 35 supra. See also Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419,
301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969); Guilmette v. Alexander, 128 Vt. 116, 259 A.2d 12 (1969).
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The Dillon Rule
California was the first American jurisdiction to extend liability
beyond the "zone of danger. ' 39 In Dillon v. Legg,40 a mother who was
not placed in fear for her own safety was allowed to recover for emo-
tional distress and resulting physical injury4' when she observed her
daughter killed as a result of the defendant's negligence.42
The California Supreme Court stated that the impact and zone of
danger rules were merely artificial abstractions, which bar recovery
contrary to the general rules of negligence.43 The court reasoned that
problems inherent in allowing recovery for negligently inflicted emo-
tional distress should be resolved by applying tort principles, not by
creating exceptions to them: "Legal history shows that the artificial is-
lands of exceptions, created from fear that the legal process will not
work, usually do not withstand the waves of reality and, in time, de-
scend into oblivion." 44
The court first applied general tort principles, noting that to limit
otherwise potentially infinite liability, a defendant is liable in negli-
gence only for reasonably foreseeable injuries, 45 and that foreseeability
of risk is of primary importance in establishing the critical element of
duty.46 Second, the court cautioned that, because duty is "inherently
intertwined with foreseeability," the extent of the defendant's duty
could not be established by a fixed rule, but could only be determined
39. See note 37 supra. Other jurisdictions followed California's lead: Connecticut
(D'Amicol v. Alverez Shipping Co., 31 Conn. Supp. 164, 32 A.2d 129 (1973)); Hawaii
(Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 728 (1974)); Massachusetts (Dziokonski v.
Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978)); Michigan (Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich.
App. 647, 207 N.W.2d 140 (1973)); New Hampshire (Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406
A.2d 300 (1979)); Pennsylvania (Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979)); Rhode
Island (D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 338 A.2d 524 (1975)); Texas (Landreth v.
Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978)); Virginia (Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 197
S.E.2d 214 (1973)); Washington (Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976)).
See generally Lambert, Tort Liabilityfor Psychic Injuries: Overview and Update, 37 AM.
TRIAL LAW. L.J. 1, 11-31 (1978).
40. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 60 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
41. Dillon was expressly limited to the situation in which the bystander manifests phys-
ical injury as a result of the emotional distress. Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at
80. Subsequent cases have refused to permit recovery under Dillon in the absence of physi-
cal injury. See, e.g., Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863
(1977).
42. Events of this sort have been referred to as "bystander" actions. See Molien v.
Kaiser Foundation Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 923, 616 P.2d 813, 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 834
(1980). This Note uses the term "bystander" to refer to anyone who sustains mental injury
as a result of witnessing, or learning about, an injury to another.
43. 68 Cal. 2d at 746-47, 441 P.2d at 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 84-85.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 739, 441 P.2d at 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
46. Id.
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on a case-by-case basis.4 7 Finally, the court identified three factors to
be considered in determining whether a plaintiff's injury was reason-
ably foreseeable: (1) whether the plaintiff was located near the scene
of the accident; (2) whether the shock to the plaintiff resulted from the
sensory and contemporaneous observation of the accident; and (3)
whether the plaintiff and the victim were closely related.48
The court concluded that the plaintiffs injuries were reasonably
foreseeable, but declined to decide whether it would conclude in the
absence or reduced weight of these factors that the accident was not
reasonably foreseeable.49
Despite the Dillon court's warning that duty must be determined
on a case-by-case basis, later decisions generally have denied recovery
in the absence of any of the Dillon factors.50
Recovery for Mental Risk Conduct
The impact, zone of danger, and Dillon rules were designed to
reach just results in situations involving physical risk conduct: conduct
that creates a risk of causing primarily physical harm to the plaintiff or
a third person. On the other hand, these rules should not be applied in
situations involving mental risk conduct--conduct that creates a risk of
causing primarily mental injury-because the factors given weight
under these rules have no bearing upon the question of whether the
plaintiff suffered mental injuries.
While some courts have applied these rules mechanically in
mental risk contexts,5' most courts have simply denied recovery when
the defendant's conduct created a risk of causing primarily mental in-
jury.52 Prior to Molien, however, two exceptions to this approach were
created and both have gained considerable support. First, several juris-
47. Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
48. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
49. Id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
50. See Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School District, 22 Cal. 3d 508, 585 P.2d 851,
150 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1978); Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97
(1977); Arauz v. Gerhardt, 68 Cal. App. 3d 937, 137 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1977); Hair v. County of
Monterey, 45 Cal. App. 3d 538, 119 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1975); Powers v. Sissoev, 39 Cal. App. 3d
865, 14 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1974). But cf. Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 723 (1969) (mother who saw injured son moments after accident occurred allowed to
recover).
The mechanical application of Dillon by California courts eliminates the flexibility of
the rule and may lead to unjust results. See notes 124-33 & accompanying text infra.
51. See, eg., Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 158 Cal. Rptr. 107 (1979), rev'd,
27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1980). Justice Poche, in dissent, argued
that Dillon should not apply when the defendant's conduct creates only a risk of mental
injury: "The tests of nearness in time and place to the 'accident' simply do not aid analysis
of the fact situation presented by the case before us." 158 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
52. See PRossER, spra note 1, § 54, at 328-30; Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 115-19 (1959).
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dictions allow the plaintiff to recover in tort when a telegraph company
negligently and erroneously transmits a message of death.5 3 Second,
some courts allow the plaintiff to recover against an undertaker who
negligently handles a relative's corpse. 54 In both exceptions, there is
"an especial likelihood of genuineness and serious mental distress, aris-
ing from the special circumstances, which serve as a guarantee that the
claim is not spurious." 55 Perhaps because of this special likelihood of
genuineness, many courts have not required the presence of physical
injury, which is a firmly established requirement in physical risk
circumstances.5 6
Thus, the plaintiff could recover in mental risk circumstances only
when the facts of the case fit within one of the two exceptions to the
general rule disallowing recovery, or when the plaintiff could convince
the court to apply the impact, zone of danger or Dillon rules in a
favorable manner.
Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals
In Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,57 a staff doctor negli-
gently and erroneously informed Mrs. Molien, the plaintiffs wife, that
she had contracted infectious syphilis and advised her to inform her
husband. She was treated for syphilis, and the plaintiff was given
blood tests to determine whether he had contracted the disease; the
blood tests established that the plaintiff did not have the disease.
The plaintiff's wife became distraught because she suspected that
the plaintiff had engaged in extramarital sexual relations; tension and
hostility mounted, leading to the couple's separation, and, eventually,
to divorce proceedings.58 The plaintiff, upon discovering the misdiag-
nosis, sued the hospital, alleging that he suffered "extreme mental dis-
tress" 59 as a consequence of the defendant's negligence. 60
53. See notes 85-89 & accompanying text infra.
54. See notes 77-84 & accompanying text infra.
55. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 54, at 329-30.
56. See notes 22-23 & accompanying text supra.
57. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
58. In commenting upon the condition of his marriage prior to the misdiagnosis,
Molien, a Daly City plumber, said, "I had a storybook marriage, and all of a sudden...
this beautiful marriage was severed through no fault of our own." San Francisco Examiner,
Aug. 26, 1980, at 1, col. 4.
59. "Molien said he cannot begin to tell the suffering he, his wife and family went
through because of the misdiagnosis." d.
60. At the appellate level, the trial court's ruling in favor of Kaiser was affirmed on two
grounds: (1) the plaintiff did not sustain physical injury, and (2) the Dillon rule was not
met. 158 Cal. Rptr. at 110-11. The plaintiff had challenged the first ground by contending
that the blood test he received satisfied the physical injury requirement, but the court was
unpersuaded. The court reasoned that when the "actionable negligence" results in physical
impact, recovery is possible for any corresponding mental injury, but when the actionable
[Vol. 33
In deciding Molien, the California Supreme Court adopted a gen-
eral rule for determining liability for negligently inflicted emotional
distress. The court allowed the plaintiff to recover for severe emotional
distress, despite absence of physical injury, because the circumstances
of the plaintiff's claim guaranteed its genuineness and because the
plaintiff's injuries were reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.6'
The court first distinguished Dillon v. Legg, reasoning that the Dil-
lon rule applies only when the "plaintiff [seeks] recovery of damages
. . . suffered as a percipient witness to the injury of a third person,"
whereas Molien was "himself a direct victim of the assertedly negligent
act." 62
The court stated, however, that although Dillon did not control the
instant case the duty approach employed in Dillon was instructive. The
court approved of the Dillon definition of duty as essentially a function
of foreseeability, and agreed that there is a duty to refrain from the
negligent infliction of mental, as well as physical, injury.6 3 The court
concluded that the doctor's misdiagnosis of Mrs. Molien, coupled with
his recommendation that she inform her husband that she had con-
tracted syphilis, could be foreseen to produce marital discord and re-
sulting emotional distress to both the plaintiff and his wife, and thus the
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to exercise due care in diagnosing
Mrs. Molien's physical condition. 64
The court next determined whether the absence of physical injury
barred the plaintiff's claim. Observing that the physical injury require-
ment's apparent purpose is to minimize the risk of feigned injuries and
false claims,65 the court stated that the requirement's main problem is
that it is both overinclusive and underinclusive. The requirement is
negligence does not produce impact, recovery must be denied unless physical injury flows
from the mental injury sustained. Using this standard, the court determined that the action-
able negligence was the misdiagnosis, not the blood test, and hence, "impact" did not occur.
Thus, because the blood test did not arise from the plaintiffs mental injuries, the court
denied recovery. Id. at 110.
The court also applied the Dillon rule. Observing that the plaintiff was not present
when the misdiagnosis occurred and that therefore sensory and contemporaneous observa-
tion was impossible, the court held that no duty arose. Id. at 111.
The appellate court's reasoning was erroneous in that the court attempted to apply
physical risk rules to mental risk conduct. Recovery could have been denied simply on the
ground that current case law would not support the plaintiffs recovery.
61. 27 Cal. 3d at 930-31, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
62. [d. at 922-23, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834. The court could have found
Dillon inapplicable on the ground that Dillon can rationally apply only to physical risk
conduct. Cf. Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 383, 334 N.E.2d 590, 593 (1975) (distinction
between direct and indirect results made in order to avoid the New York rule disallowing
recovery under Dillon circumstances).
63. 27 Cal. 3d at 922, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
64. Id. at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
65. Id. at 925, 616 P.2d at 818, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
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overinclusive because it permits recovery whenever the suffering is ac-
companied by physical injury, no matter how trivial the injury; the re-
quirement is underinclusive because it mechanically denies access to
claims that may be valid and could be proved if plaintiffs were permit-
ted to go to trial.66 For these reasons, the court concluded that the
physical injury requirement was no longer justified.67
After eliminating the physical injury requirement, the court
needed to declare a new standard that would adequately protect
against potentially unlimited liability and a flood of spurious mental
injury suits. Relying heavily upon the decision of the Hawaii Supreme
Court in Rodrigues v. State,68 the California Supreme Court adopted
the general rule that, in cases other than those in which proof of emo-
tional distress is of a medically significant nature, the general standard
of proof required is that the circumstances of the case present some
guarantee that the plaintiff sustained serious mental injury.69 Thus, re-
covery for negligently inflicted emotional distress was made to turn
upon proof of serious injury, rather than upon satisfaction of the physi-
cal injury, impact, zone of danger, or Dillon tests.
The Molien court reasoned that the negligent examination of Mrs.
Molien and the conduct flowing from the examination were objectively
verifiable actions that foreseeably caused serious emotional responses
in the plaintiff, and thus served as a guarantee of the claim's genuine-
ness.70 Finally, because it concluded that absence of physical injury
was no longer fatal to a claim for mental injury, the supreme court held
that the trial court had erred in sustaining a demurrer to the plaintiffs
cause of action.7'
Thus, after Molien, recovery for negligently inflicted emotional
66. Id. at 928-29, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
67. Other defects were discovered. The physical injury requirement was found to en-
courage extravagant pleading and distorted testimony as plaintiffs attempted to circumvent
the requirement by exaggerating physical symptoms, and to cloud the real issue of whether
the plaintiff suffered a serious injury that should be compensated. Id. at 929-30, 616 P.2d at
820-21, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838-39.
68. 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970). In Rodrigues, the plaintiffs brought an action
against the state for flood damage to their home and mental suffering resulting from the
state's negligence. The Hawaii Supreme Court held that there is a duty to refrain from
causing serious mental distress, which it defined as distress with which a reasonable person
would be unable to cope adequately. Limiting recovery to situations in which serious emo-
tional distress exists, the Rodrigues court suggested, would protect against fictitious claims
and extravagant testimony. The court further held that, in the absence of proof of emotional
distress of a "medically significant nature," a plaintiff must establish that the circumstances
of the case guarantee the genuineness of the claim of mental injury. See also Leong v.
Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Kelley v. Kokua Sales and Supply, Ltd., 56
Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d 673 (1975).
69. 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
70. Id. at 930-31, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
7 1. Id. "'I'm glad it [the case] resulted in the creation of new law,' Molien said. . . in
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distress is possible despite an absence of physical injury if. (1) the
mental injury to the plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable to the defend-
ant and therefore the defendant had a duty to refrain from the hazard-
ous conduct; (2) the plaintiff sustained serious emotional distress-
emotional distress with which a reasonable person would be unable to
cope adequately-that was proximately caused by the defendant's con-
duct; and (3) the plaintiff can establish a guarantee of genuineness in
the circumstances of the case, or can introduce "medically significant"
evidence of serious emotional distress.
Scope of the Molien Rule
One question remaining after the decision in Molien is whether the
rule adopted in that case applies only to conduct that creates a risk of
causing primarily mental injury or whether it also applies to conduct
that creates a risk of causing primarily physical injury. The decision is
ambiguous in that it appears to adopt a general scheme governing lia-
bility for negligently inflicted emotional distress, while leaving the Dil-
lon rule intact.72 The court may have intended to limit the Molien rule
to situations in which the defendant creates a risk of only mental in-
jury. If so, a plaintiff would be required to establish physical injury
and either impact, presence within the zone of danger, or satisfaction of
the Dillon rule to recover against a defendant who creates a risk of
causing primarily physical harm.73
Although the California Supreme Court may have intended to
limit the Molien rule to situations in which the defendant creates a risk
of causing primarily mental injury, the rule should be extended to in-
clude all claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Thus,
under the MAolien rule, recovery should be allowed when the defendant
creates a risk of causing primarily physical injury as long as the plain-
tiff establishes serious emotional distress, a guarantee of genuiness, and
foreseeability of the injury. This approach avoids the unfairness of
limiting Molien to mental risk cases and creates a more just system of
a phone interview, 'so no hospital or doctor can do this kind of damage ever again."' San
Francisco Examiner, Aug. 26, 1980, at 1, col. 4.
72. The California Supreme Court distinguished Dillon. 27 Cal. 3d at 921-23, 616 P.2d
at 815-17, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 833-35.
73. Interpreting Molien, the California Court of Appeal held in Hathaway v. Superior
Court, 112 Cal. App. 3d 728, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1980), that the Dillon three factor rule still
applies in bystander situations, and denied recovery to the parents of a young boy who was
electrocuted as a result of another's negligence, on the ground that the parents did not ob-
serve the injury-causing event. The court apparently interpreted Mollen as abolishing the
physical injury requirement in all claims for negligently inflicted emotional distress. See
also Cortez v. Macias, 110 Cal. App. 3d 640, 167 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1980). This Note disap-
proves of the continued mechanical application of Dillon. See notes 124-33 & accompany-
ing text infra.
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limiting liability, because its focus is on whether the plaintiff actually
sustained a serious injury that should be compensated, and whether the
public policy against potentially infinite liability would be defeated if
the defendant were held liable. Moreover, application of a single gen-
eral rule would reduce the complexity and confusion that the old rules
created.
Operation of the Molien Rule
The Guarantee of Genuineness
The California Supreme Court in Molien adopted a standard of
proof that is manifestly imprecise: "some guarantee of genuineness in
the circumstances of the case."174 While insisting that this standard is
not as difficult to apply as it seems, 75 the Molien court failed to indicate
how to apply it. An examination of the cases decided prior to Molien ,76
and their treatment of the guarantee of genuineness, may suggest the
manner in which the Molien standard wil be applied.
Guarantees of Genuineness" Mental Risk Conduct
Mishandling of Corpse Cases
Many jurisdictions have allowed recovery for mental injuries
when a mortician negligently handles, embalms, or transports the
corpse of a plaintiff's deceased relative.77 While early decisions al-
lowed recovery on a quasi-property theory, 78 it later became apparent
that no property damage was involved, but only the infliction of mental
injury. Under earlier decisions, recovery for mere negligence was de-
nied in the absence of aggravating circumstances. 79 Many jurisdic-
74. 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839. In allowing recovery for
mental injury, the Molien court adopted language used by the Hawaii Supreme Court in
Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 172, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970): "In cases other than where
proof of mental distress is of a medically significant nature, the general standard of proof
required to support a claim of mental distress is some guarantee of genuineness in the cir-
cumstances of the case."
75. 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
76. See notes 77-84 & accompanying text infra, mishandling of corpse cases; see notes
85-89 & accompanying text infira, negligent transmission of death message cases; see notes
90-96 & accompanying text infra, physician-patient relationship cases; see notes 97-101 &
accompanying text infra, beverage cases; see notes 102-05 & accompanying text infra, bank-
customer relationship case.
77. See, e.g., Carey v. Lima, Salmon & Tully Mortuary, 168 Cal. App. 2d 42, 335 P.2d
181 (1959); Torres v. State, 34 Misc. 2d 488, 228 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (1962); Morrow v. Southern
Ry., 213 N.C. 127, 195 S.E. 383 (1938).
78. E.g., Darcy v. Presbyterian Hosp., 202 N.Y. 259, 262, 95 N.E. 695, 696 (1911). See
general Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 770-80 (1951).
79. E.g., Dunahoo v. Bess, 146 Fla. 182, 200 So. 541 (1941) (aggravating circumstances
include physical injury); Beaulieu v. Great N. Ry., 103 Minn. 47, 114 N.W. 353 (1907) (ag-
gravating circumstances include wilful and malicious misconduct); Nichols v. Central V.
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tions, however, have allowed recovery for mere negligence in the
absence of aggravating circumstances and physical injury.80
California adopted this approach prior to Molien. In Allen v.
Jones,8' the court held that, when the plaintiff sustained mental but not
physical injury upon learning that the cremated remains of his brother
had been lost in transit, the plaintiff had pleaded a valid cause of action
in tort as well as in contract against the defendant who had agreed to
ship the remains. s2 While the court agreed with Dean Prosser that
there is a guarantee of genuineness under the special circumstances of
this type of case,83 it also reasoned that public policy required that mor-
tuaries be held to a high standard of care because of the likelihood of
causing mental injury to the decedent's family. Imposition of such lia-
bility, it concluded, is a "useful and necessary means" of maintaining
the standards of the profession.8 4
Negligent Transmission of Death Message Cases
A large minority of jurisdictions have allowed recovery for mental
distress despite absence of physical injury when a telegraph company
misdelivers a message announcing death or illness of a friend or rela-
tive.85 Typically, recovery has been allowed in these jurisdictions when
the message was not delivered on time, resulting in a plaintiff's failure
to attend a funeral 6 or to visit a dying relative.87 The rule has been
justified on the theory that the message is especially likely to result in
mental injury if misdelivered,88 and on the theory that the telegraph
company assumes a special responsibility to the public.8 9
Ry., 94 Vt. 14, 109 A. 905 (1919) (aggravating circumstances include physical injury and
willful misconduct); Kneass v. Cremation Soc'y, 103 Wash. 521, 175 P. 172 (1918) (aggravat-
ing circumstances include physical injury and pecuniary loss).
80. E.g., Jefferson County Burial Soe'y v. Scott, 226 Ala. 556, 147 So. 634 (1933);
Brown Funeral Homes & Ins. Co. v. Baughn, 226 Ala. 661, 148 So. 154 (1933); Wright v.
Beardsley, 46 Wash. 16, 89 P. 172 (1907). See generally Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 770 (1951).
81. 104 Cal. App. 3d 207, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1980).
82. Id. at 213, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 449.
83. See PROSSER, supra note 1, § 54, at 329-30.
84. 104 Cal. App. 3d at 214, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 450.
85. Russ v. Western Union Tel. Co., 222 N.C. 504, 23 S.E.2d 681 (1943); Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Potts, 120 Tenn. 37, 113 S.W. 789 (1908); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Lane,
152 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941). See generally T. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS § 17 (stu-
dent's ed. 1930); PROSSER, supra note 1, § 54, at 329; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
App. § 436A, at 171-72 (1965). The federal rule that controls interstate messages denies
recovery in the absence of physical injury. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Speight, 254 U.S. 17
(1920).
86. See, e.g., Russ v. Western Union Tel. Co., 222 N.C. 504, 23 S.E.2d 681 (1943).
87. See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Lane, 152 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
88. See PROSSER, supra note 1, § 54, at 330.
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, App. § 436A, at 171-72 (1965).
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Physician-Patient Relationship Cases
As Molien aptly demonstrates, the physician-patient relationship
provides fertile ground for controversies involving the "guarantee of
genuineness," as patients place their well-being and lives in the hands
of their doctors.
New York has recognized the need to protect a patient's mental
tranquility from a doctor's negligence. In Ferrara v. Galluchio,9° the
New York Court of Appeals proclaimed that "[flreedom from mental
disturbance is now a protected interest in this State," 9' and allowed the
plaintiff to recover for mental injury in a malpractice suit brought
against her doctor. The plaintiff in Ferrara sustained skin burns as a
result of her doctor's excessive application of X-ray treatments. At the
advice of her attorney, she was examined by a dermatologist, who
warned that the injury could become cancerous. The plaintiff devel-
oped "cancerphobia" as a result of this warning and brought a medical
malpractice action against her original doctor seeking, inter alia, com-
pensation for mental injury.
The court reasoned that, because it is common knowledge that
wounds that do not heal frequently become cancerous and because the
plaintiff's dermatologist warned her of this possibility, it was "entirely
plausible. . . that plaintiff would undergo exceptional mental suffering
over the possibility of developing cancer."' 92 Concluding that the plain-
tiff had established a sufficient "guarantee of genuineness in the cir-
cumstances of the case," 93 the court affirmed the trial court's verdict for
the plaintiff.94
The New York Court of Appeals recognized a guarantee of genu-
ineness in a case involving a "death message" sent by a hospital to a
patient's daughter. In Johnson v. State,95 the plaintiff's mother was a
90. 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958).
91. Id. at 21, 152 N.E.2d at 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 999.
92. Id. at 22, 152 N.E.2d at 253, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 1000.
93. Id. at 21, 152 N.E.2d at 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 999-1000.
94. Id. at 22, 152 N.E.2d at 253, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 1000. The court, however, did not
decide whether recovery was possible for mental injury alone. It acknowleged that, under
New York law, "a wrongdoer is liable for the ultimate result, though the mistake or negli-
gence of the physician who treated the injury may have increased the damage which would
otherwise have followed from the original wrong." Id. at 20, 152 N.E.2d at 251, 176
N.Y.S.2d at 998. The court, through its guarantee of genuineness analysis, merely con-
cluded that there was no basis for distinguishing the situation in which the physician aggra-
vates a physical injury from that in which the physician only increases the mental injury
attendant upon a physical injury. Id. at 20-21, 152 N.E.2d at 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 999.
See also Nieman v. Upper Queens Medical Group, 220 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1961) (when
defendant negligently and erroneously diagnosed plaintiff as sterile, failure of plaintiff to
allege physical injury did not bar plaintiffs claim for mental injury).
95. 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590 (1975). See generally Annot., 77 A.L.R.3d 501
(1977).
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patient in the defendant-hospital. When a patient with a name similar
to that of the plaintiffs mother, passed away, the hospital sent a tele-
gram to the plaintiff erroneously advising her of her mother's death.
The plaintiff viewed the corpse and became hysterical upon discovering
that the corpse was not her mother's. The New York Court of Appeals
held that, like the mishandling of corpse and death message cases, the
plaintiff's situation provided a guarantee that her claim was not spuri-
ous. Therefore, as "recovery for emotional harm. . . may not be disal-
lowed so long as the evidence is sufficient to show causation and
substantiality of the harm suffered, together with a 'guarantee of genu-
ineness,'" recovery was allowed for the plaintiffs mental injury.96
Beverage Cases
Many plaintiffs have attempted to recover for emotional injury in-
curred as a result of finding noxious foreign objects in beverages they
had consumed. 97 While these claims have had varying degrees of suc-
cess, 98 a guarantee of genuineness can be found in some claims of this
sort.
The plaintiff in Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc. ,99 drank
a soft drink containing an unpackaged prophylactic. The Supreme Ju-
dicial Court of Maine held that recovery for mental injury was possible
despite absence of physical injury: "[W]e adopt the rule that in those
cases where it is established by a fair preponderance of the evidence
[that] there is a proximate cause relationship between an act of negli-
gence and reasonably foreseeable mental and emotional suffering by a
reasonably foreseeable plaintiff, such proven damages are compensable
even though there is no discernible trauma from external causes." 1°o
The court cautioned, however, that the mental suffering must be sub-
96. 37 N.Y.2d at 383-84, 334 N.E.2d at 593. Cf. Morgan v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co.,
185 F. Supp. 20 (1960) (doctor's inability to detect fetus's heartbeat and subsequent advice
that plaintiffs baby was dead would constitute malpractice, for which plaintiff could recover
for emotional distress, but recovery denied as evidence did not support conclusion that doc-
tor had so advised plaintiff).
97. See, eg., Minkus v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 44 F. Supp. 10 (N.D. Cal. 1942); Mar-
tin v. Waycross Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 18 Ga. App. 226, 89 S.E. 495 (1916); Wallace v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970); Cushing Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
v. Francis, 206 Okla. 553, 245 P.2d 84 (1952).
98. See Paul v. Rodgers Bottling Co., 183 Cal. App. 2d 680, 6 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1960)
(plaintiff entitled to recover for pain and suffering resulting from physical consequences of
his shock caused by drinking soft drink containing mouse); Medieros v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 57 Cal. App. 2d 707, 135 P.2d 676 (1943) (cause of action stated when plaintiff became
violently ill upon drinking soft drink containing what he believed was a spider); Wallace v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970) (plaintiff entitled to recover for
shock caused upon finding foreign object in partially consumed beverage even in absence of
physical injury).
99. 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970).
100. fd at 121.
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stantial and manifested by objective symptoms before recovery could
be allowed.' 0 '
Bank-Customer Relationship Cases
The relationship between a bank and its customer has also given
rise to an examination of the guarantee of genuineness. In First Na-
tional Bank v. Langley,10 2 the plaintiff, a store manager of A & P Tea
Company, deposited a large sum of money in the defendant-bank's
night depository pursuant to his normal duties; the deposit, however,
became lodged behind the depository mechanism, where it remained
for several weeks. A & P, suspecting that the plaintiff had misappropri-
ated the store funds, took precautionary and investigatory measures:
the plaintiff was requested to take a vacation; in his absence, the store
locks were changed, the books were audited, and the merchandise was
inventoried. Finally, upon his return, the plaintiff was demoted and
transferred to another store.
The effect of these actions upon the plaintiff's health was dra-
matic.' 0 3 He sued the bank for physical and mental injuries, loss of
income, and medical expenses resulting from the bank's alleged negli-
gence in failing to ascertain the location of the deposit.
The court affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff, finding that his
injuries were foreseeable and that the defendant-bank owed the plain-
tiff, as employee of its customer, a duty to account for the deposit. 104
Therefore, as the bank failed to make a prompt and careful inspection,
the plaintiff was allowed to recover for his economic losses, as well as
for his mental and physical injuries. 05
Characterization of the Mental Risk Guarantee
The cases summarized in the foregoing discussion have several
common aspects. For example, in every instance the defendant's con-
duct created a risk of causing primarily mental injury to the plaintiff,
101. Id
102. 314 So. 2d 324 (Miss. 1975).
103. The plaintiff suffered from anxiety neurosis with depression and paranoia, causing
excessive breathing, muscular tension, shaking, sweating, and acute sensitivity to sudden
noises. In addition, he suffered severe swelling of the lips and tongue, necessitating emer-
gency treatment at one point as he was unable to breathe properly. Id. at 328.
104. Id at 329.
105. Instead of adopting a rule similar to the Molien rule, the Langley court only abol-
ished the impact rule. Id at 339. The court did make some reference to genuineness, how-
ever: "We are of the opinion that the facts in the instant case establish a genuine claim
which was subject to the determination of the jury and that the judgment of the trial court
based on the verdict of the jury should be affirmed." Id at 339 (emphasis added). The
court had no opportunity to address the physical injury issue because there was ample evi-
dence of physical injury.
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and the court held that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action for
negligently inflicted emotional distress.
Further similarities may be discerned. First, in each case, the de-
fendant's conduct was extremely likely to cause great sadness, disgust,
or anxiety in a reasonable person. This characteristic is nothing more
than Dean Prosser's "guarantee of genuineness," which exists when
there is a special likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress aris-
ing from the particular circumstances of the case.'0 6
Second, a special relationship, or what may be referred to as "priv-
ity," existed between the parties. In all cases, the plaintiff relied upon
and confided in the defendant, who had accepted certain responsibili-
ties for the plaintiff's benefit.107 This characteristic serves to increase
the probability that the plaintiff suffered severe mental injury. The de-
fendant was invariably engaged in the business of serving the public,
and, because the plaintiffjustifiably expected that the defendant would
act competently, the plaintiff was highly vulnerable to the defendant's
failure to exercise reasonable care.
Although courts have been unwilling to allow recovery in the ab-
sence of a special relationship between the plaintiff and the defend-
ant,'08 none have specifically required privity. Moreover, Molien
cannot be interpreted as requiring privity. In assessing the potential for
recovery under Molien, however, one would be well advised to consider
whether a special relationship exists; as a practical matter, its presence
or absence may control the guarantee of genuineness issue.
Guarantees of Genuineness Physical Risk Conduct
Traditionally, when the defendant's conduct has created a risk of
causing primarily physical harm, the plaintiff was required to establish,
in addition to physical injury, either impact, presence within the zone
of danger, or presence of the Dillon factors in order to establish a cause
of action. 0 9 The question after Molien, therefore, is whether these
traditional "guarantees of genuineness" remain essential to the plain-
tiff's recovery." 0 The logical answer to this question, in light of
Molen, is that the court must look not merely at the presence of one or
106. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 54, at 330.
107. The cases previously discussed involved the following relationships: (1) mortician
and relative of the deceased, see notes 77-84 & accompanying text supra; (2) telegraph com-
pany and telegraph recipient, see notes 85-89 & accompanying text supra; (3) physician and
patient or patient's relative, see notes 90-96 & accompanying text supra; (4) beverage com-
pany and consumer, see notes 97-101 & accomapnying text supra; and (5) bank and cus-
tomer's employee, see notes 102-05 & accompanying text su~pra.
108. Id.
109. See notes 16-50 & accompanying text supra.
110. It is reasonably clear that the physical injury requirement has been abolished by
Molien. Molien has been interpreted, however, as leaving Dillon intact. See note 73 supra.
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two factors in determining whether liability should be imposed, but at
all the circumstances in order to decide whether they present any guar-
antee of genuineness.
An example illustrates the distinction between this approach and
the traditional rule. If a father's daughter is killed as a result of an-
other's negligent operation of an automobile, and the father sustains a
fatal heart attack immediately upon learning of the event by tele-
phone,"' it is clear that the driver's conduct caused severe emotional
distress to the father: the heart attack guarantees the genuineness of
the claim for emotional distress. Even so, recovery would be precluded
under a mechanical application of the Dillon rule because the father's
representative would not be able to establish that the father contempo-
raneously observed the accident. Yet under the Molien rule, the fa-
ther's estate could recover if foreseeability of the injury could be
established. "1 2
While satisfaction of the impact, zone of danger, or Dillon tests
will, in many circumstances, guarantee the genuineness of the plaintiff's
claim, the critical inquiry should be whether any facts guarantee the
genuineness of the claim. Under this approach, recovery turns upon
whether the defendant's conduct resulted in serious emotional distress
and whether such injury was foreseeable, rather than upon the presence
of traditional guarantees of genuineness.
The Requirement of Serious Emotional Distress
Under Molien, a cause of action may be stated only for the negli-
gent infliction of serious emotional distress.' " 3 On the other hand, it is
not clear whether the degree of emotional distress sustained should be
measured by applying both objective and subjective standards.
Molien indicates that an objective standard should be employed:
"serious mental distress may be found where a reasonable man, nor-
mally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope with the mental
stress engendered by the circumstances of the case."' 14 The require-
ment of serious emotional distress, thus interpreted, parallels the guar-
111. Kelley v. Kokua Sales and Supply, Ltd., 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d 673 (1975). In
Kelley, the daughter's accident occurred in Hawaii, and the deceased sustained the fatal
heart attack in California. In denying recovery, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that only
those located "within a reasonable distance from the scene of the accident" can recover for
severe emotional distress. Id at 209, 532 P.2d at 676. For a review of the major Hawaii
decisions in this area, see Comment, Kelley v. Kokua Sales and Suppl, Ltd: Redfning the
Limits to Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, 11 TULSA L.J. 587 (1976).
112. It may be undesirable to find that the plaintiff's injuries were reasonably foresee-
able in these circumstances. See notes 124-33 & accompanying text infra.
113. 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
114. 1d. at 928, 616 P.2d at 819-20, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837-38 (quoting Rodrigues v. State,
52 Hawaii 156, 173, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970)).
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antee of genuineness element, which, in the absence of proof of a
medically significant nature, must be established.
It may be argued that the objective seriousness and guarantee of
genuineness elements are equivalent. If so, then the guarantee of genu-
ineness element would be required in all circumstances, because the
objective serious emotional distress requirement is absolute. The
Molien court implied, however, that the guarantee of genuineness is
not required when the plaintiff can establish proof of a medically sig-
nificant nature, 1 5 thus suggesting a distinction between the two.
The distinction may be one of degree. To establish a guarantee of
genuineness, the circumstances of the case must reveal an "especial
likelihood" that serious mental distress would result. On the other
hand, the objectively serious mental injury requirement might be satis-
fied if a reasonable person more likely than not would sustain severe
mental injuries, even though there is less than an "especial likelihood"
that serious injury would result.
If proof of a medically significant nature is established, the
probability that the plaintiff suffered severe mental injury is increased,
and, therefore, there is less need for extreme circumstances that guar-
antee the genuineness of the plaintiff's claim. A conclusion that a rea-
sonable person probably would sustain severe mental injury should be
adequate in the presence of medical proof of mental suffering. In the
absence of such proof, however, only an extreme set of circumstances
can assure that the plaintiff's claim is bona fide.
In addition to establishing that a reasonable person in the plain-
tiff's position would sustain serious emotional distress, it seems likely
that, under Molien, the plaintiff must show that he or she actually sus-
tained serious emotional distress. Requiring the plaintiff to establish
that he or she actually sustained serious emotional distress would pre-
vent an abnormally insensitive plaintiff from seeking damages in situa-
tions in which a reasonable person would have suffered severe mental
injuries, but in which he or she in fact suffered no injuries. " 6
Foreseeability
To determine whether the defendant owed a duty to exercise rea-
sonable care for the protection of the plaintiff, the risks of injury appar-
ent to the defendant when he or she committed the assertedly negligent
act must be assessed"l 17 The critical question with respect to duty is
115. 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
116. Cf. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 12, at 59 (plaintiff must actually sustain severe emo-
tional distress, and circumstances must be such that a reasonable person would sustain such
injury-unless defendant has knowledge of plaintiff's susceptibility-before plaintiff may
recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
117. Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d at 922, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal.
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whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have
foreseen the plaintiffs injury." 8
Even if a reasonable person would have foreseen injury, however,
California courts may not find that the defendant owed the plaintiff a
duty.1 9 California courts consider the public policy in limiting the de-
fendant's liability when determining what degree of foreseeability
should be deemed "reasonable."'' 20 The requirement of reasonable
foreseeability thus emerges as a function of both the hypothetical rea-
sonable person's foresight and the need to maintain practical limita-
tions upon tort liability.' 2'
Foreseeability in Mental Risk Circumstances
When the defendant's conduct creates a risk of causing primarily
mental injury, courts generally have allowed the plaintiff to recover
only if "privity" existed between the parties. 22 If this trend continues,
there will be little risk of potentially unlimited liability in mental risk
circumstances because the special relationship will serve to limit the
defendant's liability. If privity exists, liability should be imposed
whenever a reasonable person would have foreseen the plaintiff's inju-
ries and the plaintiff can establish the other elements of the Molien
rule.' 23
Foreseeabiity in Physical Risk Circumstances
When the defendant's conduct creates a risk of causing primarily
physical harm to the plaintiff and a reasonable person would have fore-
seen the plaintiff's injuries, liability should be imposed. The degree of
foreseeability required to support recovery for emotional distress
Rptr. at 834; Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d at 739, 441 P.2d at 919-20, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79-80. See
generally PROSSER, supra note 1, § 31, at 145-49.
118. Id. But see Prosser, PalsgrafRevisited, 52 MICH. L. REv. 1, 19 (1953): "Foresee-
ability of risk . . . carries only an illusion of certainty in defining the consequences for
which the defendant will be liable."
119. See, e.g., Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977).
See notes 124-33 & accompanying text infra.
120. See Mobaldi v. Regents of University of California, 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 720 (1976); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 60 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
121. See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968); Note,
Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress: Reaction to Dillon v. Legg in California and Other
States, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1248 (1974).
122. See notes 107-08 & accompanying text supra.
123. If subsequent decisions extend liability for mental risk conduct to situations in
which no privity exists, potentially unlimited liability may present difficulties in bystander
actions. However, it will be rare when a defendant creates a risk of causing primarily
mental injury to one person, and the plaintiff sustains serious mental injury upon learning of
the other's mental injuries. In any event, liability may be limited by requiring a high degree
of foreseeability.
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should be greater, however, when the defendant's conduct creates a risk
of causing physical harm to a person other than the plaintiff, but the
plaintiff sustains mental injury. To contain liability within practical
bounds in this context, the degree of foreseeability necessary to support
a cause of action should be set high enough to prevent every bystander,
every friend, and every remote relative of the injured third party from
maintaining an action for emotional distress against the defendant.
The California Supreme Court, in Dillon v. Legg, 24 adopted this
reasoning by setting forth a duty rule that focuses upon the degree of
foreseeability1 25 Recent courts, however, have interpreted Dillon as
setting forth a mechanical three factor test and have allowed recovery
only when all three factors are present.126 This interpretation of Dillon
is incorrect, because Dillon contemplated that the critical inquiry
would be whether the injuries sustained were reasonably foreseeable to
the defendant, and not whether the particular Dillon factors were pres-
ent.127 Although the Dillon factors may be relevant to foreseeability,128
their presence or absence should not control the finding of duty. 129
Thus, if a man observes a caesarian operation on his wife, and, as
a result of the doctor's negligence, the baby dies,130 it is clear that se-
vere mental injury to the father is highly probable. Recovery would be
denied, however, under a strict application of the Dillon rule because
the shock to the father would result from learning of the death from the
doctors, not from contemporaneously observing the operation1 31 Pre-
sumably, recovery would be denied even if the doctor was aware at the
time of the operation that the plaintiff's wife had lost a baby on a prior
occasion and that the plaintiff consequently underwent psychiatric
treatment. If the doctor had this knowledge, however, recovcery should
be granted under Molien because the injury would be reasonably
foreseeable.
Conversely, recovery may be allowed under a mechanical applica-
tion of Dillon when mental injury is actually unforeseeable. Thus, if
the defendant reasonably but erroneously believed that a child was an
124. 68 Cal. 2d at 741, 441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81.
125. See notes 39-50 & accompanying text supra.
126. See note 50 & accompanying text supra.
127. See notes 45-48 & accompanying text supra.
128. The Dillon factors have been criticized on the ground that they bear no logical
relationship to the foreseeability of the plaintiff's presence at the accident. Note, Negligent
Infliction of Mental Distress Reaction to Dillon v. Legg in California and Other States, 25
HASTINGS L.J. 1248, 1263-64 (1974). See also Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249
N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969).
129. Other factors that bear upon foreseeability might include the defendant's knowl-
edge of the plaintiff's presence, the time of day in which the accident occurred, the type of
neighborhood in which it occurred, and the defendant's knowledge of the neighborhood.
130. See Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977).
131. Id. at 585, 565 P.2d at 135-36, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 110-11.
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orphan and, as a result of the defendant's carelessness, the child was
killed, the child's mother could recover under a mechanical application
of the Dillon rule if she observed the accident. A reasonable person
under these circumstances, however, might not have foreseen the
mother's injury and therefore recovery might be unwarranted under
Molien. 132
While bystanders may suffer serious emotional distress, the risk of
potentially unlimited liability may be too great to allow recovery when-
ever a reasonable person would have foreseen the bystander's injury.
Thus, although Dillon presents an adequate solution 133 to this problem
by allowing recovery only when the injury is highly foreseeable, the
mechanical application of the Dillon three-factor rule fails to take into
consideration other factors that may be relevant to the determination of
foreseeability. For this reason, a general foreseeability test should be
applied, and the practice of mechanically applying the Dillon rule
should be abandoned.
Conclusion
The Molien rule involves nothing more than a return to basic tort
principles. The former rules governing liability for negligently inflicted
emotional distress emphasized the presence of certain factors: physical
injury, impact, presence within the zone of danger, and the Dillon fac-
tors. Molien addresses the real issues by simply asking whether the
plaintiff has suffered an injury that ought to be compensated, whether
the defendant's conduct is culpable, and whether unlimited liability
will result if other plaintiffs are allowed to recover in similar circum-
stances. Applied to all claims for negligently inflicted emotional dis-
tress, the Molien rule will lead to just results.
Darryl Wane Tang*
132. It may be argued that it is foreseeable that someone would be distressed upon learn-
ing of the victim's injuries, and that, therefore, when someone was injured, liability should
be imposed. However, by requiring a high degree of foreseeability, liability could be denied
on these facts.
133. See notes 128-29 supra.
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